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THE ESTABLISHtMENT OF RELIGION UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION
By William David Stout*

The Constitution of the United States specifically prohibits Congress from passing any "law respecting an establish1
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
In spite of earlier views, the Fourteenth Amendment is now
interpreted to extend this prohibition to the states. 2 -With the
doctrinaire faith of most Americans in the sacrosanctit- of
constitutions, it has never occurred to general popular opinion
in this country throughout most of our history that the faithful
observance of this provision is anything but something to be
taken for granted. Virtually all American school children, while
attending a tax-supported institution, have been lectured and
drilled on the doctrine of complete separation of church and
state, but not until they had first been refreshed in both mind
and spirit by listening to their teacher read to them from the
King James Bible. Moral teachings, based on Biblical concepts,
have been part and parcel of the public, tax-supported education of many generations, yet we take it as an axiom that temporal and religious affairs lie in two separated fields. After the
recent series of court decisions and the debate over the Taft
grant-rn-aid bill, 3 there has been developing a keen interest in
attempting to clarify the true meaning of our orgame law and
to define clearly the term "establishment of religion" as it
appears in the First Amendment. Now that certain Protestant
groups are adamant in their insistence upon complete separation of political and religious activities, it seems pertinent to
ask whether these same groups would be willing to see their
own program carried to its logical conclusion. The recent Illinois atheist case 4 seems to imply that a complete revamping ofA.B., Georgetown College; M.A., University of Kentucky Instructor in Political Science, University of Tennessee. Formerly
taught at the University of Kentucky and Connecticut College.
'U.S.

CONST. AMEND. I.

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
1213 (1940) Minersville School District v
Sup. Ct. 1010, 84 L.Ed. 1375 (1940)
'80th Congress, S. 472.
' McCullom v Board of Education of
Champaign County, Illinois, 68 Sup. Ct. 461

60 Sup. Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 60
School District No. 71,
(U.S. 1948).
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some of our basic concepts of public education and even instruction m common morality is in order, however, this question will
be treated more fully later in this article. Suffice it to say at this
juncture that the present writer has serious doubts that even
the Protestants who say the most about church-state separation
would tolerate the thought of complete separation if they fully
realized its implications. Before continuing on the present
status of religious disestablishment in the United States, it
would be appropriate to review briefly the background of the
problem as it was inherited by our ancestors from Medieval
Europe and the era of the Reformation.
The early days of Christianity in Rome offer little that is
comparable to the present church-state separation in America,
for, before the time of Constantine, the Christian religion was
an underground, outlawed movement instead of a basic cornerstone of the social and political structure. On the other hand,
the idea of a confessional state was an old tradition to the
Romans, for under the pantheistic pragmatism of neoplatonic
thought, religion generally had become an agency of state power
with the Emperor serving as spiritual head of the church, indeed of the nation. With the official recognition of Christianity as the state religion, it was inevitable that the Emperor
should attempt to transfer Is position as spiritual leader to
the new faith. Constantine himself set the precedent for later
attempts by kings and emperors to control the affairs of the
Church by calling the Council of Nicaea in spite of the insistence of the fathers, later put into formal theory by St. Ambrose, that the Church was outside the pale of imperial intervention. Not until the fifth century A.D., however, was a clear
statement of lasting effect given. By that time church-state relationships in the decaying Empire had become so confused
that Pope Gelasius I felt the need of a clarifying statement and
paregorically administered the theory of the two swords. Even
though this theory was often quoted by his successors as the
final word applicable to the problem, sacerdotiurn and smperium
served to do no more than postpone the issue to a later date, and
by the time of the great controversy that raged over the lay
investiture of clerical nobles, it appeared again as a great and
terrible two-headed dragon to plague the scholastics of the
Thddle Ages for nearly five centuries. Even with this knotty
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problem to untangle, medieval man had the issue simplified bthe existence of one, and only one, sacerdotal authority It was
not until the twin forces of nationalism and Protestantism
made their appearance that the question of church-state relationships assumed anything like modern proportions.
With the establishment of Puritan settlements in Massa-chusetts, the problem was transplanted to the New World, and
the situation became something akin to the relationships of
fourth-century Rome or a small-scale replica of the Res Publica
Christwana. New England Calvinism called for no real separation of ecclesiastical and temporal authority, and very shortly
after the founding of the Bay Colony there developed a theo.cratic government, the administration of which might well have
met with the approval of the rival Jesuits. In spite of the precedent of the First Amendment, it was not until 1840 that the
Church was finally disestablished in Massachusetts. A similar
.condition existed in colonial Virginia where there was little to
distinguish between the ecclesiastical and civil functions of
magistrates and vestrymen. Even in those areas of colomal
America where there were no official church establishments,
the Christian, specifically the Protestant ethic was the predonnnant force in the mores of the community The theory of both
swords belonging to the Church, stated by Pope Boniface VIII
and discernible in colonial America, may have given way in
time, but the American tradition of separation of church and
state that came to maturity in the Constitutional period in no
way reflects a desertion of the medieval concept of Pope
Gelasius' two swords, instead it indicates a substitution of
sectaxian Christianity without a central head for Catholic umversalism. Also it is indicative of a return to good orthodox
Gelasian dogma that forbids any man to wield both swords,
though recognition is given by the wielder of each sword of the
existence of the other. By no stretch of the imagination can the
American tradition be called non-religious. Nineteenth-century
literature, including McGuffey's readers and the "bluebacked" speller, bears witness to the strong and persevering
tradition of the Calvinist ethic. Separation in the American
mind then has meant simply the mutual non-interference in the
adminnstrative affairs of the other, but, at th6 same -time, tacit
recognition has been given by society of the iAseparability of
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religious concepts and general social functions. As one writer
has concluded in one of our more widely read religious perodicals"The community at large was Christian, indeed
Puritan, and separation by no means signified any
attempt to weaken the hold of Christian ideology and.
morals on this community. The American Supreme
Court consequently has spoken of this as a 'Christian'
nation. The Christian Sunday and holidays like
Christmas and Thanksgiving are observed by public
authority. Legislative assemblies have Christian
chaplains, as do the armed services and public institutions. Marriage by Christian ministers is recognized
by law when duly registered. Churches are subsidized
by tax-exemption. And most characteristic and important, the inner life and discipline is recognized as
beyond the jurisdiction of civil law, while public education, before the Roman Catholic immigration forced
secularization, was undenominationally Protestant in
orientation. This is a pattern of separation which is
2,5
benevolent rather than neutral to religion

In the face of this tradition, the question of why the fathers
of our Constitution were so anxious to prohibit religious establishment by the First Amendment inevitably arises. This question may be partially answered by citing the influence of
eighteenth-century rationalism and deism, but this alone could
not hold the complete answer since such nffluence was restricted
to a relatively few intellectuals. The real answer is more likely
to be found in a general recognition of the centrifugal character of American sectarianism. Under sectarian disintegration,
the relationship between sacerdotium, if such may be said to
exist, and impernium must be kept an unofficial one. In spite of
the unofficial character of this relationship., however, it cannot
be denied that there has been a close bond between the two.
Most states either permit or require portions of the Bible to be
read from time to time in the public, tax-supported schools, and,
despite the prohibitions of the First Amendment and similar
clauses in our state constitutions, the practice has been generally recognized and accepted. The universal practice aniong
the states and the Federal Government of subsidizing religion
through tax exemption might easily be construed to comprise a
violation of the First Amendment, in fact, it is difficult to consider it as anything else if we accept the view that the word
Nichols, Separation of Church and State: The Historical Background, LXV ChristianCentury 267 (1948). (Italics writer's)
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"religion" is to be taken literally rather than as referring to
particular "sects." However, the Supreme Court of the United
States has laid down the doctrine that the taxing or the licensing of any religious activity is a violation of the "free exercise
thereof.' ' The anomaly is, according to the purists, that it is
necessary to violate one part of the Constitution in order to
preserve the other. If the founding fathers had intended for the
word "religion" to mean just that literally and not "church"
or "sect," they did so only without realizing the existence of the
contradiction contained in a single sentence. The view entertained by Jefferson and Madison that there could be no real
distinction between religion and church has been upheld in a
recent dissent by Mr. Justice Rutledge as follows
"The [First] Amendment's purpose was not to
strike merely at the establishment of a single sect,
creed, or religion, outlawing only a formal relation
such as had prevailed in England and some of the
colonies. Necessarily it was to uproot all such relationships. But the object was broader than separating
church and state in their narrow sense. It was to
create a complete and permanent separation of the
spheres of religious activity and civil authority by
every form of public aid
comprehensively forbidding
'7
or support for religion.
Despite the ideas that Jefferson and Madison may have
entertained and despite the views of \h-. Justice Rutledge, the
interpretation of the First Amendment, in fact of any other
part of our Constitution, must depend as much upon our traditional practices and attitudes as upon any statement from the
courts. Any brief history of the public school movement in
America would reveal the influence and desire for propagation
of the Christian ethic as primary motivating forces in its foundiag. The important part played by the great religious revival
of the 1820's in laying the foundations of the great social and
political reform movements of the last century is the subject of
one of the most colorful, dramatic, and significant chapters m
the history of the development of this country 8 In fact, from the
'Murdock v Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 Sup. Ct. 810, 87
L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.R. 81 (1943) Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 60 Sup. Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940).

Everson v Board of Education of Ewing Tp. et al., 330 U.S. 1,
67 Sup. Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947).
Probably the most readable account of this movement and its
significance is BARNES, THE ANTI-SLAVERY IMPULSE, 1830-1844
(1933)
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standpoint of morals and ethics, if we are to make any pretense
of being realistic, we must agree with the Supreme Court that
America is a "Christian nation. " 9 Even if we wish to show deference for the leading non-Christian sect in this country, Judaism. we must conclude that there is no basic conflict in the matter of morals or ethical concepts. With or without the appear
anee on our paper currency of the motto vovus ordo seclorim,
which has been adopted by one of the Buddist sects, we do not
and need not take seriously the danger of over-emphasizing the
Hebrew-Christian ethical tradition at the expense of those of
Zoroaster, Buddha, or Confucius in order to maintain religious
neutrality Though there seems at first glance to be a great
diversitr of religious groups in America, the homogeneity of our
moral and ethical concepts is one of the distinctive features of
our heritage. o Religion, of course, is a matter of faith, therefore,
clearly out of the reach of temporal authority according to our
tradition, but it must be emphasized, even at the risk of overrepetition, that the moral and ethical concepts growing out of
the MHosaic Law and the Puritan ethic are an inseparable part
of our social, legal, and political patterns of thought and conduct.
Since conflicts over the question of encouraging sectarian
interests by public policy have historically centered in the field
of public education, the greater portion of the discussion that
follows must be devoted to the problem of sectarian teaching
supported by tax-raised funds and its legal status at the present
tune. In the course of this discussion, the following phases of
the problem will be considered, education as a public purpose.
parochial schools as agencies of meeting a public purpose.
public subsidization of parochial schools, aids to pupils or par
ents of pupils attending parochial schools, and the curriculum
of our public schools.
That public education does meet a public purpose cannot be
denied, although general acceptance of this view by the courts
is a post-Civil War development.ii The Supreme Court has said
en several occasions that state statutes calling for the use of
Church of the IHoly Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 12
Sup. Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226 (1892).
" Commager, The American Religious Scene, CXLIII NINTEENTH
'CENTURY 15-20 (1948).
" Stuart v School District No. 1 of Village of Kalamazoo, 30
Mich. 69 (1878)
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public funds for private purposes must be struck down. 12 That
Court, however, has of late found it expedient to exercise the
power of striking down such legislation with the greatest of
caution for fear of curtailing or hampering seriously one of the
functions that serves as a primary reason for the existence of
states, that of legislation for public welfare. 13 In view of this
reluctance on the part of the Court to tamper with state legislation, the question arises as to whether the states are free to decide whether or not parochial schools may be considered as
agents of public purpose.
The ruling case on this question at present is the muchdebated and widely-discussed New Jersey school-bus case,
Everson v. Board of Education of Ewnivg Tp. et aZ., 14 although
the majority decision handed down by the Court slides over the
issue of direct subsidies. For a clear pronouncement on this
issue, it is necessary to go back to the by-now classic Virgina
disestablishment law of 1785 written by Thomas Jefferson. the
preamble of which states, among other things, that
"Almighty God hath created the mind free; that
all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments,
or burthens, or by civil incapacitation, tend to beget
habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure
from the plan of the Holy author of our religion who
being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to
propagate it by a coercions on either
., that to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; that even the forcing him to support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of
giving is contributions to the particular pastor,
whose morals he would make Ins pattern

The statute itself provides, using the same line of reasoning
later adopted by iMr. Justice Rutledge in the passage already
cited, that

-

no man shall be compelled to frequent or support
any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever,
nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthThompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corporation, 300 U.S.
55, 57 Sup. Ct. 364, 81 L.Ed. 510 (1937), City of Parkersburg v.
Brown, 106 U.S. 487, 1 Sup. Ct. 442, 27 L.Ed. 238 (1882) Citizens
Savings & Loan Association v. City of Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 22 L.Ed.
455 (1874)
'Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Tp. et al., 330 U.S. 1,
67 Sup. Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947).
4
' Ibid.
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ened, in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer

on account of his religious opinions or beliefs

-...

Again, i the light of the development of American history,
it is necessary to come to the same conclusion reached concerning the Rutledge statement, that constitutional interpretation
must depend as much upon traditional practices and atitudes
as upon judicial pronouncements. The fact remains that Americans have never disassociated the teaching of moral concepts
based on the Scriptures with the public purpose of education,
but have been satisfied to allow the public schools to -act as
virtual agents for the propagation of the Protestant. ethic.
However, there have been attempts froin time to time to in.orporate parochial schools into the public school system. For case
law on this issue it is necessary to rely primarily on state court
decisions to determine whether or not these schools are sufficiently important to the public purpose to merit tax-raised
funds. The ,general concensus of opinion among these courts
seems to be that to use tax-raised funds for direct support of
parochial schools, even where public schools are inadequate, is
a violation of the Federal Constitution and the several state
constitutions.1G The most recent opinion on this issue comes
from the Illinois Supreme Court as dictum in an opinion dealing with a slightly different situation, and states that a board
of education should not help support any school controlldd by a
church: or sectarian denomination. However, the pronouncement is qualified by the dictum that it is not the duty of the
school board to be hostile or antagonistic toward religion and
churches.i 7 Judging from other decisions, we must conclude
that this latter qualification is meant to disapprove antagonism
toward either a church or churches i general. This is particularly true in light of two earlier cases coming from Louismna
tit. 4, c. 6, secs. 34-35 (1942)
'"Knowlton v Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691, 166 N.W 202, 5 A.L.R.

'5VA. CODE ANN.,

841 (1918), Williams v Stanton Graded Common School District,
173 Ky. 708, 191 S.W 507, L.R.A. 1917D 453 (1917)
Synod of
Dakota v State, 2 S.D. 366, 50 N.W 632, 14 L.R.A. 418 (1891). At
least two Supreme Court cases state that the Fourteenth Amendment
extends the First Amendment to give protection against boards of

education: West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 63 Sup. Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628, 147 A.L.R. 674 (1943)

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 43, Sup. Ct. 625, 29
A.L.R 1446 (1923).

People ex rel. Latimer v. Board of Education of the City of

Chicago, 344 Ill. 228, 68 N.E. 2d 305, 167 A.L.R. 1467 (1946)
L..J.-2
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and Oregon, both decided by the United States Supreme Court
which clearly stated that a state may, on a limited scale at least,
consider parochial schools as agents of meeting a public purpose
and that demal of the right of a parent to send ls child to a
church-sponsored school in order to meet the requirements of
compulsory attendance laws is a violation of religious freedom.is
Even though the Supreme Court is the highest court in the land,
and its decisions take precedence over those of all other courts,
that tribunal has shown some reluctance to interfere with the
right of the states to determine what is a public purpose in their
own respective jurisdictions. As 1-r. Justice Black said in the
-Everson care, already cited above, "the Fourteenth Amendment did not strip the states of their power to meet problems
previously left for individual solution.'" 9 The conclusion to be
drawn then is that our system does allow the states some latitude
in recognizing, on a limited scale, parochial schools as agencies
of public purpose, but usually frowns upon a direct subsidy of
these institutions or their incorporation into the public school
system.
Since parents are required by law in all of our states to
send their children to school, it seems fitting for the states to

grant such aid as they deem fit to those parents. This aid
-usually consists of such things as free transportation, free textbooks, and even subsidization of school lunch programs. The
legality of such aid to the parents of public school pupils can
hardly be questioned in the light of general recognition of public schools as agencies of public purpose. However, the question
now arises, since parochial schools also may serve a public purpose and since attendance at them meets the compulsory attendance laws, as to whether or not parents who send their
children to such institutions are due these benefits. Would such
help amount to public aid for sectarian purposes"
That parochial schools serve a sectarian purpose there can
be no doubt, for what purpose other than the propagation of its
" Cochran v Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370,
50 Sup. Ct. 335, 74 L.Ed. 913 (1930) Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 39 A.L.R. 468 (1925).
"ISee also: Green v Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct. 499, 64
L.Ed. 878 (1920), Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.S.
112, 17 Sup. Ct. 56, 41 L.Ed. 369 (1896), Barbier v. Connolly, 113
U.S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357, 28 L.Ed. 923 (1885) Davidson v. New Orleans. 96 U.S. 97, 24 L.Ed. 616 (1878)
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own doctrines would a religious body maintain a school system
in competition with that supported by taxation 2 On the other
hand, parochial schools are accredited by the several state
boards of education and do meet the minimum requirements
set up for public schools. Also some churches, particularly the
Roman Catholic, bring strong pressure to bear on their members
to educate their children at parochial institutions, and it is a
part of the faith of many people that it is their religious duty
to do so. Then the question must be asked as to whether it is
a violation of religious freedom to require members of a sect to
support a school that their religious belief forbids them to
patronize. It seems at first relatively easy to answer this question, using the reasoning behind the decision in the case of
Stuart v. School Dzstrict ANo. 1 of the Village of Kalamazoo in
which the doctrine was laid down that a person was liable to
pay school taxes regardless of whether or not lie had children
to -use the facilities established by them.2 0 However, this doctrine is not adequate to meet the argument that Catholics, because of their religious beliefs, are forced to support two school
systems, both of which may be considered to meet a public purpose. This argument soon reaches the point where it sinks into
the realm of the emotional and defies all solution, so it becomes
necessary simply to recall the decisions cited above and say
that direct subsidization of parochial schools is generally considered by the courts of this country to be a violation of the
constitutions of both the states and the Federal Government.
The question to be considered now is the one as to whether aid
to students attending a parochial school constitutes support of
the school.
Several state courts have ruled on this question, and in
most cases the view has been taken that subsidization of a student amounted to subsidization of the school, therefore, transportation and other aids given to students attending churchsponsored schools was a violation of the principle of churchstate separation. Typical of this view is this pronouncement of
the Supreme Court of Iowa
"'Public schools' are those which the state undertakes, through various boards and officers, to direct,
and statutes relating to transportation of pupils, read
30 Mich. 69 (1878)
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in light of such duty and obligation, must necessarily

apply only to such public schools."'"

In the light of this opinion, it may be concluded that whatever
supervision the state may exercise over the accrediting of a
parochial school is not sufficient to classify such a school as an
agent of the public purpose. The Pennsylvama Court did imply
recently that a private or parochial school may serve a public
purpose when it said that a parent may elect to send his child
to such an institution in order to meet the compulsory attendance law, but that the school code still did not provide for that
child's free transportation in any circumstance.2 2 However,
some courts have taken the view that parochial schools not only
serve a public purpose but that students attending them may
legally be given the same benefits as public school pupils. As
far as the Supreme Court is concerned, the first swing in tins
direction came in 1930 when a Louisiana law providing for free
textbooks to students of all accredited ,schools was upheld.2 3
More recently some state courts have upheld the free transportation on publicly-owned school busses of parochial school students. 24 This issue did not attract widespread attention, however, until a New Jersey decision upholding public transportation of parochial school students was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of the United States m 1947 25 Since this is at present the
ruling case, it would be well to examine it in some detail at
this time.
When the decision was handed down it was immediately
denounced by the Protestant press as being a victory for militant Romanism and a violation of our constitutional guarantees
of religious disestablishment. The editor of the Christan
Century cited it as being indicative of a desire on the part of
the Roman Catholic Church to have the stateprovide for the complete support of its parochial
schools with money derived from taxes levied on all
21 Silver Lake Consolidated School District v Parker, 29 N.W 2d
214 (Iowa 1947)
Connell v. Board of School Directors of Kennett Tp., 356 Pa.
585, 52 A. 2d 645 (1947).
1 Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370,
50 Sup. Ct. 335, 74 L.Ed. 913 (1930)
2'
Nichols v Henry, 301 Ky 434, 191 S.W 2d 930, 168 A.L.R.
1385- (1945).
Everson v. School Board of Ewing Tp. et al., 330 U.S. 1, 67
Sup. Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947)
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citizens. Its ultimate purpose is to shift to the public
treasury the entire burden of financing its parochial

schools, while the church retains control of the educational process in them. Its plan is that public school

tax funds shall be diverted to the church in an amount
that would be determined by the number of children
in parochial schools in proportion to. the number in
public schools. Thus the church would be relieved of
the financial burden of its teaching staff, cost of real
construction, cost of upkeep
estate, cost of building
''

and administration.

Despite the reasonihg of, this editorial, which-as. esentiallv
the same as that used by ir. Justice Rutledge and that em'bodied in Mr. Justice Jackson's separate dissent, the issue of
aid to parochial schools was side-tracked in the majority opinion written by Tr. Justice Black. In that statement the Court
made a clear distinction between aid to parochial schools as
such and aid to pupils attending any school in which the- compulsory attendance laws could be fulfilled. It was this latter
type of. aid 'that was upheld m the decision. The reasomng'of
the Court, however, seems faulty upon a closer exammdtion. of.
the New Jersey statute m question which reads in part
"Whenever in any district there are children living remote from any school house, the- board of' education of the district may make rules and contracts
for the transportation of such children to and from

school, including the transportation of children to and'
from school other than a public school, except such
school as ss operated for profit sn whole or in part.
"When any school district provides any transportation for public school children to and from, school,
transportation from any point in such established

school route shall be supplied to school children residmg in such school district in going to and 'rom school
school as 2s
other than a public school, except such
operated for profit zn whole or in part."
The italicized phrase at the end of each paragraph-is enough to
shatter the reasoning of the Court, Justice Black himself almost admits this in his opinion, for, by the qualification ,excepting schools operated for profit in the New Jersey -statute,
the character of the school and not the need, character,-or ain
other attribute of the student determines the eligibility, of the
parent tq receive transportation for his child at public, expense.
It seems self-evident tliat the statute is learly ..aviolation, of
LXIV, 9, 262 (1947).
"-N.J."Laws 1941, c. CXCI, p. 581. N.J. REV. STAT., art. 19, secs.
_.
.
..
14-18. (1937),-
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the Fiist Amendment in this respect. However, this particular
point was not questioned by the appellant, therefore, was passed
over by the Court. It seems that the Court, ho-wever, should not
have nussed, the point that the apparent intent of the New
Jersey Legislature -was to aid schools other than public schools,
-and in this particular case these were parochial schools. Had
the qualification been omitted from the statute, the decision in
this case would have rested on a much firmer legal basis. On
the-other hand, had Mr. Justice Jackson's view been adopted
by the Court, that any aid to a student constitutes aid to the
school which he attends, it must have been concluded that any
aid to any student in a church-sponsored institution would violate the constitution. Actually, this may be the case if decisions
always rest on logic, but it is highly doubtful that even the
Protestant press of the nation, which so vigorously decried the
Everson decision, would sit back without objection if veteran's
benefits under the "G. I. Bill of Rights" were suddenl taken
away from students attending denominational institutions.
Under the Jackson argument, the withdrawal of this type of aid
would be inevitable, for such aid is just as much a subsidy to
sectarian schools as is free transportation. It is by no means the
purpose of this article to try in any way to evaluate the merits
of the argument advanced by some that the policy of the Roman
Catholic Church is to finally win for themselves full public
support of their parochial school system, but it is the purpose
to say that even if this is the policy, a Protestant fight against
aid to students in sectarian schools as a means of checking that
policy might very easily wipe out all religious educational institutions in this country by making competition with state
schools impossible. This point is made all the more plain by the
rather -ominous implications, from the denominational-college
point of view, of the recent report by the President's Commission on Higher Education which sets up a virtual monopoly
over the'field by state universities as an ideal or goal.28 The
chief point to be regretted in the Everson case is the fact that
the Supreme Court had to hand down a ruling decision on the
basis of an examination of the New Jersey law rather than of
some statute that did not make an exception of schools operated
for profit. Had a law of the latter type been examined, the deHigher Education for American Democracy, Vol. V (1948).
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cision would be more clearly one upholding the right of a state
or the Federal Government to aid students who are meeting a
public purpose by attending any accredited school. Probably
the easiest way to justify the decision is to cite the threat of

an opposite ruling to such programs as aids to veterans attending school, curtailing of which would be very likely to raise a
storm of protest among most groups in the nation.
At present the knottiest of all the problems growing out
of the relationship of religion and state in the United States
are those dealing with the curriculum of the public school systems, and the related item of aid given to various religious activities by the states through making public school facilities and
time available for religious education. As far as public school
curriculum and facilities are concerned, the ruling case is
McCullom v Board of Educaton of School District No. 71,
Chiampaign County, Illinns,2 9 decided in February, 1948. Since
this case deals with only one aspect of the question, however,
that of religious instruction on school property, it is necessary
at this time to review the history of some similar decisions in
the state courts.
Mvany states require that teachers in the public schools
spend some time each week m teaching pupils the fundamental
concepts of morality and good behavior. Conspicuous among
these states is Illinois, generally considered to have the strictest
school code m the United States on matters dealing with the
separation of public schools from religion, for in spite of that
strictness, its code stipulates that.
"Every public school teacher shall teach the pupils
honesty, kindness, justice, and moral courage for the
purpose of lessening crime and raising the standard
of good citizenslup."
After listing several other duties of teachers, the code continues.
"The principal or teacher of each public school
shall state in his monthly reports whether the provisions of Sections 27-11 to 27-13, inclusive, of this
Article have been complied with in the school under
his control. No teacher who knowingly violates any
of the provisions of Section 27-11 to 27-13, inclusive,
3s entitled to receive more than 95 per cent of the
public school moneys that would otherwise be due for
68
Sup.
Ct 461 (U.S. 1948).
ILL. RFV. STAT., C. CXXI,
art. 27, sec. 11 (1945).
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services for the month in which such provision- is

violated. Sections 27-11 to 27-13, inclusive
shall
not be construed as requiring religious or sectarian
teaching:"" (Italics writer's.)

Attention is again called to the nature of American sOCletv
and its Puritan background, and it seems almost self-evident m
the light of this that any moral teaching must contain much
that is religious, or at least is based on the ethical concepts of
one or several sects. Thus it is difficult to see how the last
sentence of the above quotation has any real meaning. However,
with such reasomng as the Illinois Legislature used, it is not
surprising to find that the courts of that state early in the century prohibited even the reading of the Bible in the public
sehoolS on the theory that even differences in translations used
by various religious groups made the choice of versions discrimmatory 32
Despite the few rulings prohibiting Bible reading in the
public schools, the general trend in American courts is to uphold the practice, especially when no comment or interpretation
is made by the teacher. Openly recognizing the inseparability of
the. Christian tradition and the American social structure, a
Pennsylvania court said in 1898
"In

a state where Christianity seems to pervade

its laws, customs, and institutions to such a universal
extent, can it be said for a moment that the reading
of the Bible in the public schools, without comment,
is sectarian instruction
.? We decidedly think not
Of course the above opinion assumes that there is no conflict
between. various versions or translations of the Bible, although
such conflict was -the subject in 1905 of a Kentucky case in
which the Court of Appeals cited the testimony- of a Catholic
priest to the effect that although the King James Version- was
not used or authorized by his church, there was no basrc conflict between it and the Douay Version. On. the basis of tins
Ibid., sec. 15.
"People ex rel. Ring v Board of Education, 245 Ill.334, 92 N.E.
251, 29 iL.R.A. (N.S.) 442, 19 Ann. Cas. 220 (1910). For a similar
decision see Herold v Parish Board of School Directors, 136 La.
1034, 68;So. 116, L.R.A. 1915D 941, Ann. Cas. 1915A 806 (1915).
Another case, while not prohibiting Bible reading, does uphold the
right of a school board to prohibit it: Board of Education "v Minor,
23 Ohio St. 211, 13 Am. Rep. 233 (1872).
'Stevenson. v 'Hanyon, 7 Pa. Dfist. R. 585 (1898).
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testimony, the Court decided that mere recognition of the
Christian faith by reading the Bible in the public schools did
not do violence to either the Constitution of Kentucky or the
Federal Constitution.3 4 The California Appellate Court has
similarly ruled that merely shelving the Bible in public school
libraries was not a violation of that section of the California
Code prohibiting the distribution of denominational or sectar
ian literature through public institutions, since the Bible is
not sectarian.3 5 North Dakota case law has gone so far as to
state that the wearing of clerical garb by members of monastic
orders employed as public school teachers does not violate the
principle of separation of church and state, as long as no doc
trines peculiar to one sect are taught. 36 The State of Washington's case law contains a paradox reminiscent of the. Illinois
law concerning the teaching of religious doctrines in the public
schools. While stating that mere reading of the Bible is not a
violation of either the State or Federal Constitutions, the point
is emphasized by the Court that there must be no comment on
the part of the teacher. However, the Court also stated, in the
same case, that the statute requiring that the teacher teach
morality truth, justice, temperance, humanity, etc.,_must.be respected. 37 The contradiction arising in a single decision did not
seem to trouble the Coiu't greatly, the assumption apparentlbemin tlhat it was actually possible to read a selection from the
Bible and then give a discussion of morals without making
reference to the text read,
The issue that has most recently been a center of controversv over religion in the public schools is that of released time
for religious services or instruction. Generally speaking, case, law
" Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School District, 120 Ky. 608, 87

S.W 792, 69 L.R.A. 592, 117 Am. St. Rep. 599, 9 Ann. Cas. 36 (1905)
CAL. CODE, EDUCATION, sec. 8573 (Deermg, 1944)-. Evans v
Selma Union High School District, 193 Cal. 54, 222 Pac. 801, 31
A.L.R. 1121 (1924).
Gerhardt v. Heid, 66 N.D. 444, 267 N.W 127 (1936).
State ex rel. Dearle et al. v Frazier, 102 Wash. 369, 173 Pac.
35, L.R.A. 1918F 1056 (1918), WASH. REV. STAT. ANN., sec. 4855
(1932). Other cases that sanction Bible reading in the public schools
are: Lewis v Board of Education, 285 N.Y. Supp. 164 (1935), Kaplan v. Independent School District, 171 Minn. 142, 214 N.W 18, 57
A.L.R. 185 (1927) The Colorado Court, while upholding a law permitting'Bible reading, added the-;qualification that requmrmng pupils
to attend would constitute a violation of the liberties- guaranteed"
'the Federal Consitution: People
by the Fourteenth AmendmenrtAw
ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81.Cblo 276, "255 Pac. 610 -(1927) -
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upholds the right of public schools, under state statutes, to give
a specified number of hours per week to various religious groups
to hold religious instruction classes at the request of the parents,
especially when such classes are held off the school property
On this question the Illinois Supreme Court stated that released
time for religious instruction outside of school property although on school time, does not violate the state constitution or
the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution, even though
such practice adds to the duties for which school superintendents
and principals are paid out of the school fund.38 The City of
Chicago, by providing a system for keeping a check on absences
from these classes, considers such absentees as truants under the
law,3 9 a rather doubtful point in light of a later pronouncement
by the Uniited States Supreme Court discussed below. California
has faced the issue more realistically by stating that such absences "shall not be deemed absence in computing average
daily attendance. "40 This qualification may save the California
law from invalidation by the United States Supreme Court,
and has been instrumental in saving it from the Appellate
Court of that state. 41
Early in 1941 the released time practice was tested in the
Supreme Court of the United States, which by an eight-to-one
decision at least partially invalidated it. This was the case
brought up by Mrs. Vashiti MeCullom, a self-styled atheist of
Champaign, Illinois.42 Of course, this ruling does not completely
cover the issue, since it deals only with released time for religious education classes held on school property, which was held
to be unconstitutional even though the teaching was done by
teachers furnished by an inter-denommational society instead
of by state-employed teachers. The questions of Bible reading
and -released time for religious instruction away from school
property are still left in doubt. However, Mr. Justice Black, in
the majority opinion, did strongly state that the First Amend'People ex rel. Latimer v. Board of Education of City of
Chicago, 394 Ill. 228, 68 N.E. 2d 305, 167 A.L.R. 1467 (1946).
'Proceedings, Board of Education, City of Chicago, August 16,
1929, quoted by Counsel for Appellant. Ibid.
"oCAL. CODE, EDUCATION, sec. 8286 (Deering, 1944).

" Gordon v. Board of Education of City of Los Angeles, 178 P 2d

488 (Cal. 1947)

12McCullom v. Board of Education of School District No. 71,
Champaign County, Illinois, 68 Sup. Ct. 461 (U.S. 1948).
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ment should be interpreted as he had interpreted it a year
earlier, and quoted from his own opinion in the Everson ease
"Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force or influence a person ta go
to or remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.
"No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
,43
they may adopt to teach or practice religion
At first glance most Americans would probably be inclined
to accept the principle laid down by this quotation, although
they would be quite likely to change their minds if they stopped
and pondered its real significance. If no tax aid whatsoever can
be given to any religious activity, even interdenoninational or
non-denominational, it becomes clear that such traditional activities as paying ministers to open legislative sessions with
prayer are violations of the First Amendment, that tax-support
of Army and Navy chaplains is unconstitutional, and that surely
some citizens eventually will bring suit demanding an injunction to bring to an end the Treasury Department's activity in
disseminating that bit of religious propaganda "In God We
trust!" Ecce reductw ad absurdum. Again it must be repeated
that American mores are based primarily on the tradition of
Christian ethics, and no court in this land can by a simple judgment sever this connection. Also we must face the issue squarely
as to whether or not we want it severed, and realize the fact that
complete severance would prohibit us from teaching even the
basic social concepts upon which our civilization rests through
the medium of public schools. The State of Illinois provides an
act prohibiting minors from purchasing and reading certain
types of crime thriller stories as a means of checking crime and
fostering better citizenship for the future.4 4 Clarence Darrow,
in his defense of Leopold and Loeb, praised this law as a good
one and pointed out that the conduct of his clients was due to
unguided and misdirected reading. This point was seized by
William Jenmngs Bryan during the Scopes trial at Dayton,
I Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Tp. et al. 330 U. S. 1,
67 Sup. Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947).
1'IrT. REv. STAT., C. XXXVIII, art. 106 (1945).
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Tennessee. in 1925, as he rose to defend the Tennessee -statute
prohibiting the teaching of any theory of -creation that was contrary to the account found in Genesis. In tins case, evolution
itself was not the issue with Bryan, but rather the principle of
teaching fundamental morality based on the old Puritan tradition. In his last speech at Dayton, he told his audience"While on this subject let me call your attention
to another proposition embodied an Mr. Darrow's
speech. He said that Dickey Loeb, the younger boy,
had read trashy novels, of the blood and thunder sort.
He even went so far as to commend an Illinois statute
which forbids minors reading stories of crime. Here is
what Mr. Darrow said: 'We have a statute in this state.
passed only last year, if I recall it, which forbids
minors reading stories of crime. Why9 There is only
one reason; because the Legislature in its wisdom
thought it would have a tendency to produce these
thoughts and this life in the boys who read them.'
"If Illinois can protect her boys, why cannot this
State protect the boys of Tennessee? Are the boys of
Illinois any more precious than yours?"' 5
Evolution as such may have little to do with moral conduct,
and as stated above was not Bryan's chief concern. The basic
issue in this case was the right of the State of Tennessee to encourage the continuation of her social concepts winch, m theory
at least, are based on the fundamentalist concept of 'the validity
of the Scriptures. If morals are actually based on Biblical concepts, and this writer is compelled to accept the -view that there
is no other logical basis for them, what answer can be given to
the viewpoint put forth by Bryan q What kind of realism would
lead us to encourage good moral conduct on the one hand and
outlaw the use of the chief source book for our teaching on the
other? If it is contrary to our Constitution to use the Bible m
public schools, what justification can there be for teaching the
students that it is -rong to lie, cheat, steal, or torture pets? If
these activities are wrong, why are they wrong' These questions
are yet to be answered satisfactorily by the critics of Bryan,
and the failure to answer them has made Darrow's position at
the Leopold and Loeb hearings appear as an empty inconsistency
In the light of what has been said, the following conAsiiions
appear to be self-evident First, the First Amendment means
traditionally that Congress cannot establish a church, 'second,
'5ALLEN, BRYAN. AN DARROW AT-DAYTON, 187-188. (1925). -.
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this is due more to the sectarian character of American religion
than.to any real desire to completely isolate government from
the basic moral concepts that we traditionally speak of as
Christian, and third, even if it were possible to completely
separate religious concepts from politics by legislation, it would
have to be done at the expense of society's right to pass its ideals
down through successive generations. American traditions can
no more be separated from religious concepts than can those
of the M\1iddle Ages without the disruption of the whole social
and political structure. The Supreme Court, through its decision
in The' M7 Oidlom case, has opened a virtual Pandora's box, the
results of which are still m doubt. It has also brought home the
fact that Ahe First Amendment as stated is not sufficiently
clear to meet modern situations, and as traditionally interpreted.
either becomes an empty phrase or, if stretched to the limit, an
outright threat to our basic traditions. It seems that before we
can properly interpret our constitutional guarantees against religious establishment, indeed before we can feel legally secure in
using our society's chief attitude moulding agency for bringing
up our children in the basic concepts of our society, we may
need to pass a new amendment either to clarify or replace the
wording of the First Amendment.

